Bargaining set with endogenous leaders: A convergence result

Hervés Estévez, JavierAutor UVIGO; Moreno García, Emma
DATA: 2018-05
IDENTIFICADOR UNIVERSAL: http://hdl.handle.net/11093/6533
VERSIÓN EDITADA: https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0165176518300363
MATERIA UNESCO: 5307.05 Equilibrio Económico
TIPO DE DOCUMENTO: article

RESUMO

We provide a notion of bargaining set for finite economies where the proponents of objections (leaders) are endogenous. We show its convergence to the set of Walrasian allocations when the economy is replicated.
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